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CITATION TO THE RECORD
All citations to the record on appeal, shall be as follows:

"R." followed by the page number where the referenced

portion of the record can be located.

Citations to the tran-

script portion of the record shall be as follows: "Tr." followed by the page number where the referenced portion of the
transcript can be located.

JURISDICTION
For the reasons set forth herein and in appellee's memorandum in opposition to appellant's motion to amend docketing
statement, appellee contests the court's jurisdiction.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The original docketing statement, which appellant has
admitted contains an improper basis for appeal (see appellant's
brief at pp. 6 and 11), states that the issue to be appealed is
whether, in a contempt proceeding, a court can award attorney's
fees against the party found in contempt.
After the original due date for the filing of his brief,
appellant attempted to amend his docketing statement to include
new and different bases for appeal. Appellee has objected to
appellant's efforts to amend his docketing statement to assert
new bases for appeal.
In the event this court determines it can properly consider appellant's new bases for appeal, appellant's issues on
1

er appellant's new bases for appeal, appellant's issues on
appeal appear to be as follows:
1.

Whether the trial court committed reversible error by

refusing to consider evidence of provocation relating to
appellant's violation of the trial court's order which enjoined
him from contacting appellees business premises and appellee's
employees;
2.

Whether appellant's counsel was ineffective by

failing to rebut appellee's affidavit of attorney's fees and by
failing to challenge an amended return of service which showed
that appellant had duly received a supporting affidavit when
served with the order to show cause.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The court, under Rule 10(e) of the Utah R. Civ. P. . can
dismiss this appeal due to appellant's own representations that
there is no merit to the original basis for appeal. Appellant's original docketing statement filed herein provided that
the issue on appeal was whether the trial court could award to
appellee its attorney's fees incurred in prosecuting the order
to show cause.

Appellant has admitted in its filings that

there is no merit to an appeal on that basis.

See appellant's

brief at pp. 6 and 11. However, appellant has subsequently
amended his docketing statement to discard his previous basis
for appeal and add new bases for appeal. Appellant's new
theories include the trial court's refusal to consider mitigat2

the alleged ineffectiveness of appellants counsel.
In the event the court allows appellant to continue his
appeal on the bases set forth in his amended docketing statement , appellee submits that the appropriate standard of review
is as follows: With respect to the trial court's alleged
refusal to consider mitigating factors, the appropriate standard for review is the "clearly erroneous" standard of review.
See Von Hake v. Thomas. 759 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Utah 1988) (an
appellate court should apply the "clearly erroneous" standard
of review when reviewing contempt proceedings).

Findings are

clearly erroneous only if they are without adequate evidentiary
support.

See State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987).

With respect to the issue of ineffectiveness of counsel,
appellee submits that because this issue was never determined
by the trial court, this issue is not properly before this
court for review.

This issue cannot be raised for the first

time on appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
a.

Nature of the case.
Appellant appeals from contempt proceedings held

against him.

Appellant he was sentenced to three days in jail,

ordered to pay appellee's attorney's fees and fined for at
least ten violations of a previous court order which enjoined
appellant from telephoning appellee's business premises and
from telephoning or contacting certain of appellee's employees
3

at their residences or any other location,
b.

Course of proceedings.
Appellee filed a verified complaint in district court

against appellant on February 6, 1992 seeking a preliminary and
permanent injunction enjoining appellant from telephoning
appellee and appellee's employees at appellee's place of
business and from telephoning appellee's employees (with the
exception of defendant's then estranged wife, Susan Bullock) at
their residences or at any other location.

R. at pp. 2-6.

A temporary restraining order was issued on February
6, 1992 temporarily restraining appellant from engaging in the
harassment described above and setting a date for hearing on
the motion for preliminary injunction.

R. at pp. 25-26.

A

hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction was held on
February 13, 1992. On February 25, 1992, the court entered an
order enjoining appellant from telephoning appellee or any of
its employees at appellee's place of business and enjoining
appellant from telephoning appellee's employees (with the
exception of Susan Bullock) at their personal residences or at
any other location.

R. at pp. 31-32.

On June 26, 1992, appellee filed a motion for order
to show cause on the basis that appellant had violated the
court's order by making a number of harassing telephone calls
to appellee's employees.

R. at pp. 33-38.

In the meantime, a

supplemental affidavit of Tony V. Divino was filed setting
forth ten additional threatening and harassing telephone calls
4

left on Mr. Divino's answering machine on June 27, 1992. R. at
pp. 49-52.

The hearing on the order to show cause was origi-

nally scheduled for July 6, 1992, but was continued to the
following day.
c.

R. at pp. 48; Tr. at pp. 100-109.

Disposition.
The trial court found appellant in contempt of a

court order on the basis that appellant had telephoned Tony V.
Divino, the chief executive officer of appellee, and left at
least ten violent, highly threatening, abusive and intimidating
messages on Mr. Divino's answering machine.

R. at pp. 86; Tr.

at p. 156. The court found ten violations and fined appellant
$50.00 per violation.

R. at pp. 86 - 87; Tr. at p. 156.

Appellant was also ordered to spend three days in jail.

R. at

pp. 87; Tr. at p. 157. The court subsequently ordered appellant to pay plaintiff's reasonable attorney's fees in the
amount of $2,445.50 for pursuing the order to show cause.

R.

at pp. 79-82 and 88-89.
Appellant's original docketing statement provided
that the issue on appeal would be whether the court could award
appellee its attorney's fees in connection with the contempt.
Appellant has subsequently represented and admitted to the
court that his original basis for appeal had no merit.

See

appellant's brief at pp. 6 and 11. Appellant is now relying
completely on new bases for appeal.

5

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The trial court entered an order on February 25, 1992

preliminarily enjoining appellant from telephoning or contacting appellee or any of appellee's employees, at the business
premises of appellee.
2.

R. at pp. 31-32.

On March 20, 1992, despite the foregoing preliminary

injunction, appellant left a message on the answering machine
of Tony V. Divino, chief executive officer of appellee.

R. at

p. 42.
3.

On June 24, 1992, appellant left two additional

messages on Mr. Divino's answering machine.
4.

R. at pp. 42-43.

On June 26, 1992, appellee filed a motion for order

to show cause as a result of the foregoing telephone calls. R.
at pp. 33-43.

The court issued an order to show cause on June

26, 1992 ordering appellant to appear on July 6, 1992 to show
cause why the court should not find him in contempt, impose a
fine, sentence him to jail and award appellee its reasonable
attorney's fees.
5.

R. at pp. 44-45.

On June 27, 1992, subsequent to the issuance of the

order to show cause, appellant left at least ten additional
threatening and harassing messages on Mr. Divino's answering
machine.

R. at pp. 49-52 and 85. These messages were tran-

scribed as follows:
Saturday, June 27, 1992, 5:10 p.m.:
"Tony, John Bullock. I understand you're
gonna (unintelligible) with summons. Good.
It takes a long time to get it on."
6

Saturday, June 27, 1992, 7:47 p.m.:
"You're on the phone, asshole. You act
like you're busy. You're out playing with
your kids and taking care of shit, you
know. But it's short hair, short balls,
short self. You read me boy? This is war
and your fucking little balls are gonna
pay."
Saturday, June 27, 1992, 8:30 p.m.:
"Tony, I doubt you've got the hair on your
balls or that your balls are big enough or
that you're tall enough, you know (laughter) . Here's how it goes boy. I go to
prison on the violation of this order. I
got Tony Volpi. I got him recorded. He's
guilty as hell. You protect him. You
fucking run your own business. That's it."
Saturday, June 27, 1992, 8:32 p.m.:
"Here's the way we can resolve this, Tony.
I can go to the F.B.I, and (unintelligible)
you're dealin' dope." (laughter).
Saturday, June 27, 1992, 8:33 p.m.:
"Or, you short haired, short balled, short
little asshole, you can go to court and you
could admit that you're allowing it to be
dealt. I've got it all recorded. I've got
Tony Volpi up here basically admitting it.
Hey, you fucking asshole, I tried to
straighten you out. I tried to straighten
you out."
Saturday, June 27, 1992, 8:52 p.m.:
"Tony, I talked to your parents. I told
them that you allow, I couldn't really tell
them that you encourage (unintelligible)
Tony Volpi up there that got my wife. Fuck
you boy."
Saturday, June 27, 1992, 8:54 p.m.:
"John Bullock, 966-3252. Your kid is involved with screwing with my wife cause he
allowed Tony Volpi to deal dope at his
7

dealership.

That's it."

Saturday, June 27, 1992, 9:27 p.m.:
"Been talking with the Toyota of Ogden
office, Tony. And, uh, behind Volpi is
some guy who calls himself the third. And
he's been telling me that I'm gonna suck
his dick, and then he tells me he's got Sue
in the bathroom sucking his dick. And he's
really crazy because all of this shit plays
on talk radio. I recorded it. That's the
way it goes, boy."
Saturday, June 27, 1992, 10:35 p.m.:
"Yeah, Tony, John Bullock again. I was
just on talk radio and I was talking about
dealers of Japanese cars in Ogden. Okay,
you're not quite identified yet but I was
talking about how they took my wife and
they, uh, like through, I didn't say Tony
Volpi's name, but, uh, through Tony Volpi,
he introduced her to cocaine and heroine
and through this the third guy, I was told
tonight as I called they got her in the
back room sucking cock so she can't talk.
I don't know what the fuck you're running
up there, boy, but I'm telling you that
when some fucking guy like that talks to me
like that I make you responsible!"
Saturday, June 27, 1992, 10:37 p.m.:
"Tony (unintelligible) when I go to prison,
they'll talk to me. Guess what else? When
I talk to those boys down there that know
my gym, and how well I treated people like
them, you're gonna get 50 or 40 more phone
calls—or something."
6.

Appellant was served with the order to show cause,

the motion in support thereof and an affidavit of Tony Divino
on June 29, 1992.

See copy of amended constable's return in

the appendix hereto (a copy of the amended constable's return
is also contained in the appendix to appellant's brief).
8

7.

At the hearing scheduled for July 6, 1992, appellant

was represented by counsel Ray S. Stoddard who requested that
the matter be continued.
following day.

The court continued the matter to the

Tr. at pp. 107-109.

On both July 6 and 7, appellant7s counsel argued

8.

extensively that the court had no jurisdiction on the basis
that appellant was not served with an affidavit when served
with the order to show cause. Tr. at pp. 100-107, 113 and 116.
At the beginning of the proceedings on July 7, appellant's
counsel renewed its motion that the court lacked jurisdiction.
Tr. at p. 113. After the amended constable's return was
submitted to the court, appellant's counsel again renewed his
motion.

Tr. at p. 116. However, the court was satisfied that

it had jurisdiction.
9.

Tr. at p. 177.

At the July 7, 1992 hearing, the court heard evidence

from Mr. Divino regarding the aforementioned messages he
received from appellant.
10.

Tr. at pp. 120-129.

The court heard testimony from appellant of his

admission that he made the telephone calls outlined in Mr.
Divino's affidavit including testimony that he remembered
calling Divino twice on the 27th and vaguely recalled the tenth
message he left on Mr. Divino's answering machine.

Tr. at pp.

143-145 and 150 ("And we are not contesting the actual contempt.

We feel he did violate the court order.

ting that.")

9

He is admit-

11.

The trial court heard testimony that appellant could

not remember other telephone calls made on June 27, 1992
because he was intoxicated.
12.

Tr. at p. 142.

The trial court heard testimony that appellant

believed he was provoked into making the telephone calls by
appellee's employees and that he was intoxicated at the time he
made the telephone calls to Mr, Divino.

Tr. at pp. 135, 13 6-

144.
13.

After hearing testimony, the trial court noted that

the alleged "goading" or provocation would not have occurred if
appellant had not violated the order by making the initial
telephone call to appellee's place of business.

R. at pp. 86;

Tr. at p. 155.
14.

Based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, the

court found that at the time of the violation of the order,
appellant was aware of the order, had the ability to comply
with the order and willfully and knowingly failed and refused
to comply with the order.
15.

R. at pp. 85-86 and Tr. at p. 155.

The court also noted that appellant's conduct consti-

tuted a "flagrant violation" of the court's order and that the
court had never had a contempt case where there had been such a
clear violation.

Tr. at p. 156. Further, the court noted that

the messages left on Mr. Divino's machine were violent and
highly threatening, abusive and intimidating.
16.

Tr. at p. 156.

The court ordered appellant to spend three days in

jail and pay a fine of $500.00 ($50.00 for ten violations of
10

the order)
17.

R . .r. u p B ^ - H
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ing t h e court's ruling were entered *
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I aw support>9 2„

R. at

84-87.
18.

i \ subssqi u *i it 01 < i* =!Mi 11 e g a i < :1 :i 1 < 3 < i t 1; : 1: 1 ic ay's fees w a s

entered 01 1 August :i 0, 1992.

This order awarded appellee its

attorney's fees i n the amount of $2,445.50 incurred in p r o s e c u t i r u j I In I:; c)] : der I: : si: u ::::« cai lse
19
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a t pp

8 8 -8 9

.• •

Tl: le n o t i c e of appeal was f i l e d < :>i 1 August 24
90.

1992.

• •

' 111

days) on September 29, 1992.
that t h e basis '

ThiL docketing statement stated

appeal w a s • • *

o . t -i. - no authority •

order defend
tion with t h e contempt.
2:.:i

Appe] ] ee filed a motior *• dismiss due to the lat<*

fi 1 i ng of the docketinq statem*

Tint

. - • l / , 19"').".

m o t i o n w a s subsequently denied.
22.

On Octobei

w a s due, appelj .

the day before appellant's brief
-

-

» It 1 I In 1 I y <J.iy *?xt e n s i nii l u

file h i s brief.
z),

23

Appellee opposed appellant's motion 01 1 October

24,

On November 15, 1993, appellant filed a motion to

199 3 •

amend h i s docketing statement.

In tlle memorandum in support

that motion, appellant represented t : • 1:1 ic :::c HII : t tl: lat tl
1±

;
n.^^ :

"appears to have been without merit" and that he "perceived no
meritorious argument for appeal as originally filed,"
25.

Appellee objected to appellant's attempt to amend his

docketing statement at this late stage of the proceedings.
26.

Appellant filed his brief on November 22, 1993 under

the apparent assumption that the court would allow him to
continue his appeal under the bases set forth in his amended
docketing statement.
27.

This court subsequently ruled that appellant's motion

for extension of time to file brief and motion to amend docketing statement were granted.

Appellee's motion to dismiss was

reserved pending plenary presentation and consideration of the
case.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED.
The present appeal should be dismissed on the basis that
appellant has admitted his appeal as originally filed lacks
merit and because his appellate brief is based upon issues not
asserted in the original docketing statement.

The amended

docketing statement was filed well beyond 21 days after the
notice of appeal was filed and can therefore be dismissed under
Rule 9(e) of the Utah R. App. P.
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POINT
APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO REVERSAL OR
ON BASIS OF INEFFECTIVE COUNSEL.
Th^ claim oi J nettect.i vencss <'»! ."nniv.fl : :> h * »i1 11 f be denial
because

' cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

Ku'tthe:

L-iiis was . contempt hearing in a civil ivise and a

constitutional clai m o 4

.:=. rfecti ve assist ance nf cviiim, ,<> 1 does

not apply.
Even if appe i KIIII. Ii.ifi «i claim. oj; ,;• a loi ineffectiveness of trial counsel, appellant has ta.:*

•-<-> ^eet its burden

i)f showing that his counsel was ineffective and that lie
a2 leged i i icffectivej less WGI aid 1 ;ai *c cat ised a different result in
the tria1 court•

P0I1 IT III
ALLEGED FAILURE OF COURT TO CONSIDER MITIGATING
FACTORS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE REVERSIBLE ERROR,
Appellee submits that the trial court heard and considered
ample testimony ot alleged provocation as potential mitigating
I a e t OJ s

•

i I I in mi ni in I 1 1 1 1 1

in I

, i >, i s o v r> 1 1 1 1 e i • i mi I i i 1 1 ;

without merit. Additional1y, the alleged provocation arose out
••*• appellant's voluntary conduct ••• violating the court's order
I H 11' pIJ > * M e t i1 I l| L

ll"t

«, 1»ij !.i ' l i e s i : i»r em.i

ses.

Therefore, the trial court was justified if It rejected appellant 's claim of provocation ,
Pi iia] ] y, I IK1 I ai I I licit appel I,ml «a« mil pui isheil or
sanctioned under Utah Code Ann. §78-32-10 J as severely as he
I

could have been sanctioned, militates against appellant's claim
that the court's alleged failure to consider mitigating circumstances constitutes reversible error.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED.
On November 15, 1993, one month after his appellate brief
was originally due and over thirty days after appellant requested a thirty-day extension to file his brief, appellant
filed a motion to amend his docketing statement.

The original

docketing statement set forth as the issue on appeal that the
court lacked authority to award appellee its attorney's fees in
connection with the order to show cause regarding contempt. No>
other issues were stated.

In his memorandum in support of

motion to amend docketing statement, appellant admits that such
a basis for appeal is without merit:
Defendant's review of the trial court transcript in case file as provided indicate
that the appeal as filed appears to have
been without merit....Appellant perceives
no meritorious argument for appeal as originally filed...
Additionally, appellant's brief acknowledges that the
original basis for appeal is without merit.

See appellant's

brief at pp. 6 and 11. Consistent with appellant's acknowledgment, the case law in Utah is clear that under the "costs and
expenses" provision of Utah Code Ann. §78-32-11, attorney's
14

fees can be proper] y awarded in a contempt proceeding.
e.g. . Bradshaw v. Kershaw, <

.».2<1

IJ.'M, M I
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See,

vmt)
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ci njirwl Ki.siii for appeal with i lew bases focusinr on the
alleged ineffectiveness of appellant's counsel

Uiw I

court level and the court's failure to consider alleged provor.rit i.on a?1"1:: i inn i. t icjaii iinq f a c t o r .

T h e brief filed b y appellant

based upon the amended docketing statement.
not be allowed to w.iir th • i 4

^ »v: after
•- *
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1Ile original basis for appea
appellar* *r

. .,

s

s

Apr .i
<> original date

statemen

r

cr

: eplace

£fecti\e . i low

:

h»- appeal u u • .it > completely new appeal
appeal

and docketing statement

ractice flies

the rules of appe] ] ate procedure.

< rcice .-z

In short, because appellant
in*J i* ni I

mi I I teciiiiiir-.'i1"

I hi.1

amended docketing statement was filed well beyond the time
prescribed under Rule 9(e) of the Utah R. A P P . P., the appeal
ilii >u .hi I .it • 11 i ,sm I s st Mil.

POINT II
APPELI J \ NT IS NOT ENTITLED TO REVERSAL OR NKW TR II M,
ON BASIS OF INEFFECTIVE COUNSEL.
A p p e J laml

in "I

the trial court leve

.

.in

^

ill

i iiiiiH f oc«1 i y«» i i I I I I I P . P I

--.-»pt-r method for addressing

alleged attorney misconduct ui ineffectiveness is to move the

il

trial court for a new trial. See, e.cr. , Nelson v. Truiillo, 657
P.2d 730, 734 (Utah 1982).

In civil cases, even if a party

requests a new trial, new trials are generally not granted
based upon the incompetence or negligence of the party's trial
counsel.

Jennings v. Stoker. 652 P.2d 912, 913 (Utah 1982).

At any rate, an appellate court cannot consider a motion for a
new trial because such a motion should be made in the trial
court (see id. at 913) under Rule 60(b) of the Utah R. Civ. P.
See Stewart v. Sullivan, 506 P.2d 74 (Utah 1973) (Rule 60(b)(7)
is broad enough to allow a court to set aside an order on the
basis of incompetent counsel).
In the present matter, appellant is effectively asking
this appellate court to grant a new trial on the basis of
ineffective counsel.

This procedure is inappropriate under the

authorities cited above.1

However, if this court determines it

can properly review the issue of ineffectiveness of counsel in
this case, appellee submits appellant has failed to meet his
burden of showing that his counsel was ineffective and that had
his counsel done the things appellant claims should have been
done, the result would have been different.

See Jennings, 652

P.2d 914.
Criminal cases in Utah establish that in order to prevail

*It should also be noted that because the trial court
record is generally insufficient, even in criminal cases, the
appellate court is generally not competent to review claims of
ineffective counsel. See State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027,
1029 (Utah 1991).
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Effective representation does not

require counsel to object when doing so would be futile.
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W i t h respect, to t h e issue of award o f a t t o r n e y ' s
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fees, appellant has no constitutional right to effective
counsel.

In Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988), the

Utah Supreme Court held that the distinction between civil
contempt and criminal contempt is that a contempt order is
criminal if its purpose is to vindicate a court's authority,
even though the order arises from civil proceedings.

A con-

tempt order is civil if it has a remedial purpose, either to
coerce the individual into complying with the order given for
the benefit of the other party, or to compensate the aggrieved
party for injuries resulting from the individual's failure to
comply with the order.

Id. at 1168. Under this case, the

award of attorney's fees, which was clearly intended to compensate appellee, is in the nature of a civil contempt order and
the constitutional guarantees asserted by appellant do not
apply.

See Davidson v. Munsey, 80 P. 743, 745 (Utah 1905)

(proceedings under Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-11 are civil and not
criminal in nature) (decided under prior law).

Appellant has

no claim of ineffectiveness with respect to the attorney's fees
issue.
Even if this court determines that appellant can
assert his claim of ineffectiveness in relation to the
attorney's fees issue, appellant was not prejudiced by its
counsel's alleged ineffectiveness.

Although the reasonableness

of the fees was never rebutted, the court, in all of its
experience and knowledge concerning reasonableness of fees,
found that the fees were reasonable.
18
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Despite the amended constable's return, appellent/s
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beginning of the proceedings on J 11 ] } 7, 1 993, appellant's
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counsel renewed the objections made the day before regarding
jurisdiction.

Tr. at p. 113. After the amended constable's

return was submitted to the court, counsel again renewed its
objection.

Tr. at p. 4.

Despite counsel's efforts to chal-

lenge jurisdiction, the court expressed its satisfaction that
it had jurisdiction in this case.

Tr. at p. 117.

It is clear from the record that appellant's counsel
made extensive challenges to the jurisdiction of the trial
court.

The fact that he failed to make a direct objection to

the amended constable's return does not, on the authorities
cited previously, constitute performance falling below the
objective standard of reasonableness.

No evidence has been

submitted by appellant supporting his contention that the
failure to object to the amended constable's return constituted
conduct below the objective standard of conduct or that he was
denied a fair hearing as a result of his counsel's failure to
object.

It is clear from the transcript of the hearing that

the court had determined it had jurisdiction despite the
arguments made by appellant's counsel. Tr. at p. 117.

Even if

counsel had objected, it is apparent the result would have been
the same.
A review of the transcript of the contempt hearing
reveals that appellant's counsel was active at the hearing,
made objections to assert his client's position and otherwise
zealously represented his client.

In his brief, appellant

admits his counsel was "persistent". Appellant's brief at p.
20
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i n contempt.

A s a resu.1 t of 111: i <> w 11 ' ui id" ict,- def endai it was

fined, jai led for three days and,, ordered to pay p l a i n t ! f f ,:i ts
attorney J"s fees.

It i s difficult to i magine that t h e result

would have been any d :i fferent i f appc il ] ai i, t::,|rs counsel 1: lad
performed as appellant believes h e should have performed.
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FACTORS N O T REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Appellant claims that
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factors surrounding appellant's contempt of t h e court1" s order.
The alleged mitigating factor asserted by appellant is that
a p p e 1 1 anil

WHS | HI O"« mkoi I I i " i'i| ipo I l o o * MI ompl ciyeesi,,

appellant made telephone calls to Mi

in 1 I in I ninn,

Di vi no's residence and

his answering machine which resulted In appellant being found
i in con
quired t

ti.-su

:ontempt

.» showing (1) that defendant

knew what w a s required by previous court order, (2) that h e h a d

the ability to comply with such order and (3) that he willfully
and knowingly failed and refused to do so.
Colemanf 664 P.2d 1155 (Utah 1983).

See Coleman v.

After hearing the evi-

dence, the trial court made these findings.
At any rate, even if alleged provocation is relevant in a
contempt proceeding, a review of the transcript of the order to
show cause hearing reveals that the court heard ample testimony
about and was aware of alleged mitigating circumstances.
Appellant admitted that he attempted to call his estranged wife
at appellee's business premises which was in violation of the
court order.

Tr. at pp. 134-136. Appellant claims that the

person who was on the other end of the telephone made an
insulting remark to him and that because he had been drinking
substantially, he responded "in kind" which was reflected in
the messages he left for Mr. Divino.
139.

Tr. at pp. 137 and 138-

Appellant was also allowed to testify that when he drinks

substantially he cannot control himself and is not aware of
things he does.

Tr. at pp. 140-141.

In short, the court heard the alleged provocative statements and also heard that appellant had been drinking, inferring that appellant's conduct was somehow excused or that any
penalties imposed by the court should take the mitigating
factors into account.
In response to appellant's assertions, the trial court
noted that if appellant had not violated the order in the first
place by initiating telephone calls, he would not have been
22

provoked.

Tr. at p. 155. The alleged provocation arose from

appellant's own misconduct in failing to comply with the court
order.

Appellee submits that appellant's argument that the

court's failure to admit evidence of the alleged mitigating
factor constitutes reversible error is without merit.
In further response to appellant's claim, it should be
noted that he was not punished as severely as he could have
been punished under Utah Code Ann. §78-32-10. Appellant was
fined $50.00 a piece for ten violations of the court order.
The maximum amount he could have been fined for each violation
was $200.00. Additionally, appellant was sentenced to merely
three days in jail.

However, the statute gave the court

authority to sentence him for thirty days for each violation.
In short, despite the "flagrant violation" of the court order
and the violent, threatening and abusive nature of the telephone messages left on Mr. Divino's answering machine, the
penalty imposed was minimal in comparison to what the court
could have imposed.

It is difficult to imagine that appellant

could have been treated less severely than he was.

In light of

the evidence presented at the hearing, even if the alleged
mitigating factor of provocation should have been considered,
appellant has failed to establish that the "clearly erroneous"
standard has been met in this case.

The penalties imposed in

this case for contempt were reasonable and supported by the
evidence.

Appellant was not prejudiced by the trial court's

alleged failure to consider mitigating factors.
23

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, appellee respectfully requests
the court to dismiss the appeal or, in the alternative, deny
the relief requested by appellant and to award appellee its
costs and attorney's fees incurred in defending this appeal.
DATED this [ 0

day of January, 1994.
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee

lis V. Haslam, (#1408)
.liam W. Downes, Jr., (#0907)
in W. Holt, (#5720)
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APPENDIX TO APPELLEE'S BRIEF

Amended Constable's Return (attached)

CONSTABLE'S RETURN
I, JAN PHELPS

, being first duly sworn on oath and say:

I am a duly appointed Deputy Constable, Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
citizen of the United States over the age of 21 years at the time of service
srein, and not a part of or interested in the within action.
I received the within and hereto annexed,
IDER TO SHOW CAUSE & MOTION & AFFIDAVIT
MEMORANDUM
I the 26 of JUN

, 1992 , and served the same upon BULLOCK, JOHN R.
(

within named defendant in said,

(

IDER TO SHOW CAUSE & MOTION & AFFIDAVIT
MEMORANDUM

(

\ serving a true copy of said,
IDER TO SHOW CAUSE & MOTION & AFFIDAVIT
MEMORANDUM
>r the defendant with JOHN R. BULLOCK (PERSONALLY)
person of suitable age and discretion there residing at,
175 WEST 4700 SOUTH #59

,SALT LAKE CITY

.3/her usual place of ABODE

, on this 29 day of JUN

,1992

I further ceritfy that at the time of service of the said,
tOER TO SHOW CAUSE & MOTION & AFFIDAVIT
MEMORANDUM
endorsed the date and place of service and added my name and official
Itle thereto.
On the 29. day of JUN

Deputy /f~

, 1992

Auf&-

SL

SQ2

Robert Reitz Constable, Salt Lake County
396 Cypress St., Midvale Ut, 84047 580-1741
^s

Service Fee
Mileage
2nd Address
p
ostage/Filing
Copies
Extra Cost

$6.00
$15,00

Total

$21.00

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused four copies of the forego- i
ing APPELLEE'S BRIEF to be mailed, postage prepaid, on this
day of January, 1994, to:
John R. Bullock, Pro Se
Defendant-Appellant
5075 West 4700 South, #59
West Valley City, UT 84118

1124\003\bnefapp
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